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PES AND MOTIVATIONS TO ADOPT SILVOPASTURE
Highlights
• Individuals have diverse, complex motivations to adopt pro-environmental behaviour.
• Acknowledging this heterogeneity is key for cost-effective conservation policies.
• We uncover  3  motivational  perspectives  for  silvopasture  adoption  in  a  tropical  forest
context.
• Payments may not be the most appropriate incentives for pioneers regarding adoption.
2
1Payments for pioneers? Revisiting the role of external rewards for sustainable 
innovation under heterogeneous motivations
1 1 Introduction
2 When deciding whether to adopt pro-environmental practices, individuals confront trade-offs 
3 with multiple other activities in which to invest their resources and effort. In this process of 
4 decision-making, the profit maximising rationale is intertwined with other motivational drivers of 
5 human behaviour (Calle et al., 2009; Noppers et al., 2014). Even an apparently homogeneous 
6 microcosm such as a small rural community in the frontier of a tropical forest is composed of 
7 individuals whose behaviour is driven by a high diversity of goals and values (Bathfield et al., 
8 2013). People have diverse ways of interpreting the same phenomena (Bennett, 2016) and, due to 
9 heterogeneous motivations, goals and preferences, the response of individuals to the same types of 
10 incentives may vary remarkably (Bolderdijk et al., 2012; van der Werff et al., 2013). This 
11 motivational diversity can partially explain the unpredictability or ineffectiveness of external 
12 interventions1 for environment and development (Kline and Wichelns, 1998); it can induce highly 
13 variable behavioural responses and, plausibly, undesired outcomes of policy instruments.
14 Among different policy instruments to favour sustainable productive systems, policies based 
15 on economic incentives and market transactions are increasingly being promoted. However, the 
16 suitability and the superiority of market-based instruments over other types of incentives is heatedly 
17 questioned and contested, particularly when they are aimed at encouraging innovative activities 
18 (Kemp and Pontoglio, 2011) such as silvopasture (an agroforestry system that integrates cattle 
19 farming). In the case of Payments for Ecosystem Services (PES), key debates refer to their political 
20 legitimacy (Corbera and Adger, 2004), long-term effectiveness and efficiency (Muradian et al., 
1 Here we understand the notion of external programs as those designed and implemented by organisations outside of 
the recipient community. 
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21 2013; Sierra and Russman, 2006; Wunder, 2006), potential interactions with social norms (Villamor 
22 and van Noordwijk, 2011), effects such as crowding intrinsic motivations for conservation 
23 (D’Adda, 2011; Midler et al., 2015; Narloch et al., 2012), and interwoven efficiency and equity 
24 impacts (Corbera and Pascual, 2012; Narloch et al., 2011; Pascual et al., 2014, 2010).
25 Remarkably, the theory underlying PES relies on an implicit major assumption of rationality 
26 associated with utility-maximising behaviour; it is assumed that agents predominantly act upon a 
27 simple cost-benefit rationale (Ferraro, 2001; Ferraro and Kiss, 2002). Such characterisation of 
28 human beings may be adequate to predict behaviour in contexts involving innovation that is more 
29 profitable financially, decisions driven by self-interest, and/or activities predominantly framed in a 
30 market economy (Heyman and Ariely, 2004). However, this model may fall short when additional 
31 motivations or goals have a considerable role as drivers of behaviour (Edwards-Jones, 2007; Steg et 
32 al., 2014). Some examples of such additional motivations are giving higher importance to long-term 
33 benefits or to livelihood security, or having a strong social interest relative to self-interest 
34 (Gsottbauer and van Den Bergh, 2011).
35 Much effort and care are put into designing targeting approaches of PES to maximise 
36 environmental additionality under constrained program budgets (Alpizar et al., 2015; Wünscher and 
37 Engel, 2012). We argue that such a targeting effort may fail if the heterogeneity of participants' 
38 motivations towards pro-environmental behaviour is not adequately considered. This is especially 
39 the case if PES are to be adaptable to each stage of the diffusion process (Rogers, 1962), 
40 particularly for PES to stimulate what motivates early adopters, or so-called pioneers, innovators or 
41 visionaries of pro-environmental behaviour (Baumgart-Getz et al., 2012; Egmond et al., 2006). Yet 
42 a balance needs to be kept between the precision and the transaction costs of a policy.
43 While the importance of heterogeneous motivations has been long recognised in 
44 environmental policy (Kline and Wichelns, 1998), few studies use information about heterogeneity 
45 of motivations in order to explain behavioural decisions and adoption of sustainable agricultural 
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46 innovation (with exceptions such as Blazy et al., 2011; Läpple and Kelley, 2013). This paper 
47 uncovers the diversity of motivations that influence active pro-environmental behaviour (as 
48 opposed to passive conservation) of smallholders that participate in a programme for sustainable 
49 land use through the adoption of silvopasture. The study is contextualised within a voluntary project 
50 for fodder tree cultivation in a community in the buffer area of a Biosphere Reserve in the state of 
51 Chiapas, in tropical Mexico.
52 In order to analyse the heterogeneity of perspectives regarding adoption of silvopasture, we 
53 use Q methodology, a systematic approach to understand subjective perspectives. Beyond the Q 
54 analysis, we also contrast these perspectives with observed data about livelihood strategies and with 
55 individuals' short-term adoption within the silvopastoral project. The results shed light on the 
56 potential for different forms of external rewards to effectively incentivise those farmers that are 
57 more likely to adopt and continue silvopastoral practices. Our analysis of the diverse motivations 
58 for pro-environmental behaviour provides important insights for designing adaptive environmental 
59 conservation policy that promotes the adoption and continuation of social-ecological innovations.
60 2 Case study
61 2.1 Silvopastoral systems and their adoption in the tropics
62 Extensive overgrazing, including at small scales, is a threat to soil and forest conservation in 
63 the frontier of biodiversity-rich tropical forests (Geist and Lambin, 2001). Deforested land in 
64 mountainous areas degrades under strong rainfall in the wet season and compacts under grazing 
65 (Valdivieso-Pérez et al., 2012). This degradation affects ecosystem functions (including the 
66 system's capability to buffer primary forests) and increases the likelihood of severe perturbations 
67 such as floods and landslides (Richter, 2000).
68 Silvopasture is a type of agroforestry that involves fodder-tree cultivation in pastureland. This 
69 approach has a double benefit: it rehabilitates the landscape and provides feed for cattle also during 
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70 dry season, when the lack of pasture in some areas is critical. It is considered an adequate 
71 compromise between conservation objectives and livelihoods in social-ecological systems 
72 characterised by an important livestock component (Broom, 2013; Murgueitio et al., 2011). Its 
73 implementation requires preventing cattle from accessing the trees for a period that ranges between 
74 half to a few years, until the trees are strong enough to survive animal browsing.
75 Many decentralised projects to promote silvopasture have recently been implemented in 
76 tropical forest margins to rehabilitate landscapes while promoting sustainable livelihoods. A 
77 remarkable initiative has been RISEMP, a multi-site programme carried out by regional research 
78 institutions in three Latin American countries, funded by the World Bank and reported in various 
79 studies (e.g. Garbach et al., 2012; Montagnini and Finney, 2011; Van Hecken and Bastiaensen, 
80 2010). Pagiola and colleagues (2008, 2007) find that the impact of PES in the adoption of 
81 silvopasture is complex, one reason being that the effect of PES in such systems may be different 
82 depending on recipients' motivations and interests.
83 Silvopasture has long been a successful management system in a number of traditional 
84 agroecosystems (e.g. Iberian dehesas) and it holds much promise for areas in which cattle farming 
85 is a more recent phenomena (such as recently colonised tropical forest frontiers). Nevertheless, its 
86 diffusion has been slower than envisaged in economic and environmental performance assessments 
87 (Cubbage et al., 2012; Gutiérrez et al., 2008), and this lack of adoption has received little attention 
88 in the literature. 
89 The literature about factors affecting agroforestry adoption is mostly focused on explicitly 
90 measurable farm, household and personal characteristics, amenable to adoption probability analysis 
91 (Pattanayak et al., 2003), but not on stakeholders' perspectives. In addition, the literature is scant 
92 with regards to silvopasture adoption beyond observable characteristics (with the exception of Calle 
93 et al., 2009; Frey et al., 2012; Hayes, 2012). The relationship between cognitive variables and 
94 behavioural intention is abundantly addressed in social-psychology theory, yet its empirical 
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95 application to agroforestry adoption and conservation practices in farming is scarce (Lokhorst et al., 
96 2011; McGinty et al., 2008).
97 2.2 Encouraging silvopasture in Chiapas
98 Chiapas had the largest total loss of forest per year among Mexican states in the 1990s 
99 (Céspedes-Flores and Moreno-Sánchez, 2010) and the second largest in the 2000s (Hansen et al., 
100 2013). There is little evidence of a forest transition leading to forest recovery (García-Barrios et al., 
101 2009; Vaca et al., 2012). The reasons for this permanent deforestation are epitomised in the case 
102 study explained below.
103 In the Pacific side of Chiapas, La Sepultura Biosphere Reserve lies on the mountain range that 
104 stems from the Andean spine (Figure 1). In the buffer zone of the reserve (the area within the 
105 reserve limits but located outside of the core and the outstanding natural area), lower areas and 
106 South-oriented slopes are highly deforested. The landscape surrounding human settlements is highly 
107 anthropized and faces an increasing risk of soil erosion (Valdivieso-Pérez et al., 2012) due to 
108 unsustainable farming practices. Predominant livelihood activities in the buffer area include the 
109 production of the traditional Mexican milpa (based on maize and beans), livestock and shade-grown 
110 coffee farming, the latter ecologically restricted to only certain areas.
111
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Figure 1: Location and zonification of La Sepultura Biosphere Reserve in Chiapas, Mexico.
Note: 167,310ha. Sources: CONANP (2006) and INEGI (2012). Made with QGIS (2016).
112
113 Among the various small communities (ejidos) in La Sepultura, Los Ángeles is a 
114 representative one with a population of over 800 people (Trujillo-Vázquez, 2009) distributed in 
115 approximately 200 households. The land property regime is a hybrid between the traditional ejido 
116 communal lands and customarily recognised private land. Since the community settled down in the 
117 1960s, the surrounding forest was progressively cleared for maize first, and converted to cattle 
118 farming afterwards (Sanfiorenzo-Barnhard et al., 2009; Valdivieso-Pérez et al., 2012). Following 
119 the North American Free Trade Agreement, farming activities began to diversify. With the 
120 protection of the area in 1995, farming expansion was restricted. Cattle farming became a preferred 
121 livelihood option, mostly limited by financial capital and land ownership. Cattle farming is seen as 
122 less risky than cash-crop agriculture because the latter is highly dependent on rainfall and on the 
PES AND MOTIVATIONS TO ADOPT SILVOPASTURE
7
123 price of chemical inputs. However, this preference is also heavily influenced by variations in 
124 international market prices (García-Barrios et al., 2009).
125 As in the rest of Mexico, households in La Sepultura currently have access to a diverse range 
126 of external payments for different purposes, as well as to incentives from various sources in order to 
127 promote new sustainable livelihood activities. External PES-like schemes are increasingly viewed 
128 by authorities as a cost-effective approach to tackle a range of policy issues (Muñoz-Piña et al., 
129 2008). In the case study, many such payment schemes coexist for cattle and agricultural extension, 
130 for carbon capture projects, and for hydrological ecosystem services.2 Distribution and 
131 conditionality for such diversity of payments differ across programmes. Farmers are driven by 
132 different motivations to participate in these payment schemes (Shapiro-Garza, 2013).
133 In Los Ángeles, the research institute El Colegio de la Frontera Sur (ECOSUR) implemented 
134 a pilot voluntary and participatory project since 2007 (see García-Barrios, 2012) to encourage cattle 
135 farmers to plant native fodder trees in small pasture plots of their own. The project provided 
136 incentives in the first year in the form of fencing material and training (Trujillo-Vázquez, 2009). In 
137 2008, after a first group of 22 volunteers had planted saplings, the local office of the National 
138 Commission of Protected Areas (CONANP) provided additional budget for fencing material for 22 
139 more participants, who became part of the group under joint institutional coordination. In 2009, a 
140 total of 68 smallholders participated, and CONANP supported these efforts with additional material 
141 and cash payments distributed at the group's own criteria (further details are given in Zabala, 2015).
2 The main payment programmes are 'Oportunidades' from SEDESOL (Mexican national secretariat for social 
development), Procampo (Mexican national programme for direct support to farms) and Progan (Mexican national 
programme to encourage cattle productivity) from SAGARPA (Mexican department of agriculture, livestock, rural 
development, fisheries, and food), PESH (Mexican national programme for payments for hydrological services) and 
Proarbol from CONAFOR (Mexican national commission on forestry), and carbon capture projects by Ambio 
(Mexican NGO).
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142 Participants were required to plant the trees in order to receive material and payments, but 
143 there was no real conditionality because success in the establishment of fodder trees did not 
144 influence the reward received. The actions carried out to cultivate the trees, and the resulting 
145 number of trees and their height and quality were monitored for each of the plots (Trujillo-Vázquez, 
146 2009).3 The reasons behind the highly variable performance are unclear and scarcely related to age 
147 or to the caring activities carried out (Trujillo-Vázquez, 2009).
148 3 Q methodology
149 Q is a structured methodology (also known as Q technique or Q-sort) to explore complex 
150 problems in which distinct human perspectives are involved. This exploration is done by identifying 
151 different patterns of thought existing within a group on a topic of interest, and this identification 
152 needs not be based on a preliminary hypothesis (Brown, 1980; Watts and Stenner, 2012). Patterns 
153 of thought are described through a set of statements that represent the whole set of possible opinions 
154 around a topic. The statements are given to a purposely selected sample of respondents. Each 
155 respondent sorts them on a grid with several columns that typically represent an ordinal scale from 
156 most agree to most disagree. 
157 The analysis reduces the responses down to a few perspectives (the factors) that best represent 
158 all the views found in the group. These factors are the weighted average response of respondents 
159 grouped by similarity (for details, see Zabala, 2014; Zabala and Pascual, 2016). Factors depict the 
160 view of an archetypical respondent who would best represent that factor, although they do not 
161 necessarily describe any specific real respondent. The view of each respondent will usually be more 
162 closely related to one factor than to the rest.
3 In each plot, a median of 62 trees were grown (including saplings that were found about to die), which had a 
cumulative median height of 8.2m per plot (Trujillo-Vázquez, 2009; Zabala, 2015)⁠.
PES AND MOTIVATIONS TO ADOPT SILVOPASTURE
9
163 This methodology is increasingly being used across disciplines, particularly in social-
164 environmental studies and ecological economics, and for different purposes, such as policy 
165 evaluation or participatory processes. It is used to identify typologies such as conservationist 
166 opinions about market-based instruments (Sandbrook et al., 2013, 2011), farmer environmental 
167 perspectives (Davies and Hodge, 2012), opinions about new environmental legislation (Buckley, 
168 2012), stakeholder views on energy from biomass (Cuppen et al., 2010), sustainability discourses 
169 (Barry and Proops, 1999), perceptions about the uses of forest (Nijnik et al., 2010; Rodríguez-
170 Piñeros and Mayett-Moreno, 2014) and, more recently, on semi-subsistence farmers’ motivations to 
171 conserve agrobiodiversity (Nordhagen et al., 2017).
172 3.1 Q-set: statements and their structure
173 A comprehensive sample of statements was built based on expert consultation, in-depth 
174 interviews with four farmers, previous literature, and after extensive fieldwork gathering 
175 quantitative and qualitative data on livelihoods, as well as questionnaires about stated preferences 
176 on silvopastoral practices conducted on 103 heads of households. The selection of statements 
177 follows a hybrid approach by including both naturalistic (directly from respondents' 
178 communication) and ready-made statements (expert formulated; McKeown and Thomas, 2013). 
179 The initial sample contained 66 statements.4
180 The final set of 26 statements (Listed in the Appendices) cover five topics that are most 
181 relevant to explain farmers' perspectives with respect to adopting silvopasture, based on literature 
182 and on prior fieldwork. These topics are as follows: (A) importance of external payments in 
183 livelihoods, (B) environmental and conservation values, (C) personal attitudes towards work and 
4 In order to select the statements from the initial sample, the 66 statements were classified into six topics: 
silvopastoral (14 statements), subsidies/ programmes (16), land/ forest conservation (33), future generations (5), 
livelihood (30) and cattle (20). The topics were not mutually exclusive. These statements were given a relevance 
score of 0-3 by the authors, which aided in the final selection of 26 statements.
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184 livelihoods, (D) beliefs and preferences about cattle farming and land use, and (E) preferences and 
185 trade-offs between planting fodder trees and other livelihood activities, including perceptions about 
186 potential benefits of fodder trees.5
187 The total number of statements was low in comparison with other Q studies in order to ease 
188 the sorting process for respondents, some of whom read slowly due to lack of practice. However, 
189 the statements selected covered sufficiently the topics explored in this research and provided 
190 sufficient variability in the responses, as explained in the results. 
191 3.2 Respondent selection and administration of Q method surveys
192 The statements were designed and administered in Spanish (original versions shown in the 
193 Appendices). Everyone in the research team were native speakers. The wording was adapted after 
194 pilot testing with experts in the local context and with trusted members of the community, in order 
195 to ensure that the statements were concise and clear, and that their meanings did not overlap. 
196 The method was individually administered to 32 heads of households, all of them participants 
197 in the fodder tree planting project described above and for whom secondary data on involvement 
198 and short-term adoption were available (Trujillo-Vázquez, 2009). Respondent selection followed 
199 maximum-variability sampling to include a diverse spectrum of smallholders, by using a factorial 
200 design based on observed variables. From the 68 individuals who participated in the fodder tree 
201 planting project, we shortlisted individuals with highest, lowest and median values of a subset of 
202 key variables: cattle specialisation, levels of income, land and livelihood diversity, and level of 
203 short-term adoption. All respondents were male, because culturally in this context the male head of 
204 household makes and implements decisions over land use. We excluded non participants because 
5 Each statement was also classified in three further vectors: attitudes, preferences, perception or trade-offs; whether 
they refer to the present or the future; and whether they refer to respondents themselves, their descendants, or non-
human life.
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205 we were interested in the motivations affecting the level of adoption (i.e. their interest, compromise 
206 and effort), not simply in the motivations to participate (i.e. their initial interest). Respondents were 
207 interviewed individually face-to-face in August 2010 and January 2011. From those sampled (36), 
208 one decided to stop sorting the statements after the survey had started due to fatigue, and three were 
209 not available at the time of the survey.
210 Each respondent divided the statements into three piles of agreement, disagreement and 
211 neutral, based on their own views. Next, respondents sorted the statements in a board with a 
212 standard pyramidal shape of seven columns representing an ordinal scale (Figure 2). Respondents 
213 sorted the statements according to their own agreement: from most agree to most disagree. Finally, 
214 respondents briefly explained the reason for sorting the statements in the most extreme positions.
Figure 2: Q methodology distribution for this study
−3 −2 −1 0 1 2 3
Most disagree Most agree
215
216 3.3 Analysis of factors
217 The analysis in Q methodology reduces responses to a few main types of perspectives (named 
218 ‘factors’ in Q methodology). This is done by means of multivariate analysis, in which respondents 
219 are correlated instead of variables (see details in Brown, 1980; Zabala and Pascual, 2016).
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220 We retained three factors after assessing a number of standard criteria in Q (see e.g. Watts and 
221 Stenner, 2012) 6 and as a parsimonious compromise. Together, the three factors explain 54% of the 
222 variability in the views of respondents, a percentage that is consistent with other Q studies (e.g. 
223 Buckley, 2012; Lansing, 2013). Responses were selected as defining (flagged) for a given factor 
224 following the standard criteria in Q: those with higher factor loadings in a given factor and with 
225 significantly different factor loadings in comparison to other factors. Four respondents were not 
226 flagged because they had relatively high loadings in two or three factors, implying that they shared 
227 features from more than one view simultaneously.
228 In addition, we implemented a novel analytic approach of bootstrap re-sampling in Q in order 
229 to obtain more precise levels of confidence of the results and to enhance the accuracy of the 
230 interpretation (see details in Zabala and Pascual, 2016). The bootstrap approach produces variability 
231 (spread) measures specific to the scores of each statement for each factor (standard errors that show 
232 their relative stability) and more accurate point estimates. The bootstrap was run in 3,000 steps 
233 using PCA and varimax rotation, and using the package 'qmethod' (Zabala, 2014) for R statistical 
234 language (R Core Team, 2016).
6 The first six factors have eigenvalues higher than two and more than one defining respondent, while the first twelve 
have eigenvalues higher than one. The scree plot indicates that three or four factors would be adequate. The third 
factor explains 13% of the variance and the fourth and fifth factors explain 12% and 10% respectively. A fourth 
factor is defined by only three out of the 32 respondents, one of whom defines it in the opposite direction (high 
negative loading). Importantly, a preliminary interpretation of this fourth factor suggests that the view represented 
would be very similar to the first factor, with a few traits shared with the second one. We also ran a sensitivity 
analysis of the final results by selecting from two to eight factors, in order to see whether any of the results changed 
noticeably in the first few factors. Moderate changes are found in the fourth factor, and significant changes in the 
fifth and subsequent factors. We also run a sensitivity analysis to identify highly influential respondents. A single 
highly influential case is found, but we decided not to exclude it from the subsequent analysis.
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235 4 Results and interpretation
236 The analysis yields three main results: the respondents' factor loadings (Appendices), the 
237 overall factor characteristics, and the statements' factor and z-scores (Figure 3). The overall 
238 characteristics (explained variability and number of defining Q-sorts) indicate that the first factor is 
239 highly representative of over a third of the sample and explains a quarter of the total variability in 
240 the responses (25% of the total variability explained, 13 defining Q-sorts). The other two factors 
241 also explain a substantial amount of the variability (factor 2, 17%; factor 3, 13%), and all factors are 
242 represented by a considerable number of defining Q-sorts (factor 2, 8 defining Q-sorts; factor 3, 7).
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Figure 1: Statements selected for Q sorting, bootstrap estimates of their z-scores and distinguishing 
statements (filled symbols)
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Note: Ordered from most distinctive (top) to consensus, based on z-score differences. Error bars show the standard error 
from the bootstrap. Filled symbols indicate that the statement is distinguishing for the given factor. 
243
244 The statement scores are the main results used for interpretation. The z-scores are the 
245 “weighted average of the values that the respondents most closely related to the factor give to a 
246 statement” (Zabala & Pascual 2016). Statement z-scores suggest how the archetypical respondent 
247 for each factor would sort the statements. The z-scores are presented here in a novel, synthetic dot-
248 chart format (Figure 3). For example, this figure shows that factor 3 disagrees with statement 15 in 
249 a distinctive manner in comparison to factors 1 and 2, while it agrees with statement 21 much more 
250 than the other factors do.
251 The interpretation of factors is based on the statement results: their salience within each factor 
252 and their distinctive position comparing to that of other factors. Statements that have significantly 
253 different scores across factors are distinguishing statements (in Figure 3, statements in which the 
254 horizontal distance between markers is large) and they represent an issue of clear disagreement 
255 among factors (e.g. statement S12). Statements with the lowest differences in scores across factors 
256 are of consensus (markers which are very close to each other; e.g. S25) and indicate common 
257 ground and shared understandings of the issue, or otherwise taboos.7 As standard in Q, factors are 
258 named based on their qualitative interpretation. The justification for these names is given in the last 
259 paragraphs of each factor interpretation below.
260 4.1 Comparison of factors with observed characteristics
7 We also analysed the results of statements according to their topic (letters A-D in table of statements in 
Appendices): calculating the means and standard deviation of z-scores for each topic, in order to see if any one topic 
was predominant (high absolute averages) or controversial (high deviations) within a given factor, and to compare 
the responses across factors. This did not yield remarkable insights for this study.
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261 In addition to the standard Q analysis, the factors are compared with observed characteristics 
262 of individuals: key livelihood and socio-economic variables and short-term level of adoption as 
263 monitored in the fodder tree planting programme (data from Zabala, 2015 and Trujillo-Vázquez, 
264 2009). This comparison has the purpose of describing how these characteristics relate to the factors 
265 within the given sample and has descriptive merit rather than inferential, due to the size and 
266 purposive nature of the sampling.
267 The comparison was done by means of correlation coefficient tests between the factor 
268 loadings —that quantify the similarity of each participant with each factor— and the additional 
269 variables. Table 1 shows the correlation test results for these livelihood variables, including 
270 specialisation in cattle farming, in other livelihood activities, dependence on external payments, and 
271 endowments.8
272
8 In addition, we run ANOVA test for differences among groups according to the level of income (measured in four 
categories). These tests give no significant results, suggesting that there are no differences in terms of income 
among the perspectives.
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Benefits from cattle farming (%) –0.33* –0.38* 0.37*
Benefits from wage labour (%) –0.05 0.40* –0.24
Benefits from commerce (%) 0.08 0.08 –0.34*
Benefits from external payments (%) 0.06 –0.06 0.09
Livelihood diversity (number of activities) –0.13 0.06 0.05
Total land owned (Ha) –0.17 –0.39* 0.26
Experience with cattle farming (years) –0.43* –0.23 0.46*
Age –0.12 –0.16 0.21
Number of youth in the household 0.38* –0.12 –0.08
Adoption 0.24 0.23 –0.18
Number of defining Q-sorts by level of adoption:
No plants 6 3 6
Some plants 3 4 1
Many plants 4 1 0
Note: Values correspond to Spearman correlation coefficients between variables and factor loadings for each factor, 
except for the number of defining Q-sorts by level of adoption. Significance:* p < 0.1. Sample N = 32. For the last 
variable (level of adoption), counts of individuals defining the factor (flagged) are given.
273
274 The level of short-term adoption is defined for this study as the outcomes of growing fodder 
275 trees, measured as cumulative height of tree per plot. Adoption was measured one year after the 
276 planting of the saplings (Trujillo-Vázquez, 2009) and in the case study is a satisfactory 
277 approximation for biomass. This measure was used to categorise farmers into three groups: those 
278 with many plants, with some plants, and with none. Table 1 (last three rows) shows the contingency 
279 table of defining Q-sorts by the category of short-term adoption in which they fall.
280 More specialisation in cattle farming distinguishes factor 3 from the rest (in both years of 
281 experience and percentage of benefits from cattle). Respondents related to factor 3 appear to have 
282 more land, although this is not significant. Dependence on subsidies (external payments) does not 
283 significantly distinguish factors, neither does the diversity in livelihood strategies. The comparison 
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284 of defining Q-sorts with categories of adoption suggests a pattern: most of those who had many 
285 plants are definers of the first factor, and most of those who define the third factor had no plants. 
286 4.2 Interpretation of results
287
288 There is a general consensus that food self-sufficiency is desirable (S9), that conserving the 
289 forest is the responsibility of the landowner (S10), and that fodder trees do not take much time and 
290 effort to grow (S14). By contrast, major disagreements refer to the importance given to external 
291 payments, preferences on cattle farming, and perception about land. Factors 1 and 3 are opposite in 
292 their view of external payment schemes (S15, S21). Cattle farming is a topic of remarkable 
293 disagreement (topic D in Appendices); there is no consensus with regards to any of the seven 
294 statements. The overall perception about land degradation is salient in opposite ways for the second 
295 and the third factors (S12). Each factor show distinct preferences towards planting fodder trees 
296 (S17, S2, S16): high preference (factor 2), disengagement (factor 1) and low preference (factor 3). 
297 Attitudes towards innovation and self-sufficiency are rather distinct for the three factors too (S22).
298 The following interpretation of the different types of smallholders’ perspectives (factors) is 
299 structured around three main themes: (i) preferences about investing in increasing the cattle herd, 
300 improving pasture, and planting fodder trees; (ii) the reasons why silvopastoral practices are 
301 adopted; and (iii) whether such practice would be continued beyond the experimental period.
302 4.2.1 The self-sufficient pioneer
303 The first factor represents an individual who is pragmatic, self-sufficient, and an innovator. 
304 He9 is confident about his capability to maintain his family in an autonomous way and without 
305 depending on external financial help (S15, S4, S23). He gives the lowest importance to external 
9 The description uses male nouns throughout because all the interviewees were men, as explained in Section 3.2 , and 
it refers to perspectives held by individuals, rather than by a collective (they).
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306 payments in comparison to the other two factors, and clearly rejects them as being necessary for the 
307 family; PES may not be motivational. He is proactive about learning by experimenting with new 
308 practices in order to improve his livelihood (S22), and he considers that he could improve very 
309 much his work in cattle farming with further training (S19). He has no clear preference between 
310 investing in more cattle or in planting fodder trees, but he would much prefer to invest in better 
311 pasture (S2). He thinks it is convenient to take care of the fodder tree plot even though he has other 
312 work to do, and does not perceive land availability as a constraint (S20, S26).
313 The characteristics that would make this person successfully adopt and continue silvopasture 
314 are his pro-activeness to experiment with innovative practices, his willingness to learn in order to 
315 improve his performance, and his remarkable preference to remain self-sufficient and independent 
316 from external payments.
317 This type is identified as a pioneer within a diffusion process, that is, an initial adopter or 
318 innovator. This identification is based on his distinctive response to statement S22 and to 
319 indications of better performance in the pilot project. Despite not being significantly associated with 
320 age, he typically has a young family and fewer years of experience with cattle farming (Table 1). 
321 This is a sign of youth and of needing to secure an income in the medium term, and therefore of 
322 potentially more receptiveness to innovations.
323 4.2.2 The environmentally-conscious follower
324 This factor represents an individual that is conservationist, other-regarding, concerned about 
325 the future, and a follower in the context of adoption of livelihood innovations. He has the highest 
326 degree of environmental awareness and shows concern about soil degradation (S12, S6). He also 
327 has a higher preference for fodder trees than the other two factors (S17, S2). He prefers to invest in 
328 fodder trees more than in pasture, and remarkably more than in stocking more cattle. For such an 
329 individual, the awareness of environmental problems may be an important driver of pro-
330 environmental behaviour.
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331 His perception about the importance of external payments is ambiguous. While he shares the 
332 self-sufficient pioneer's views on payments (S21), he expresses a clear need for external payments 
333 in order for his descendants to eke out a livelihood (S15). This might be due to pessimism about the 
334 future, founded on his perception about land being degraded, and presumably about the lack of 
335 employment elsewhere.
336 While this type of farmer is more receptive to PES-like incentives, his actions may be 
337 strongly motivated by a higher awareness about the need for environmental conservation (S12). 
338 Thus we define this factor as environmentally-conscious. His environmentalist views are supported 
339 by the engagement with two further assertions: that the payments provided are not the only reason 
340 for participating in external programmes and that, during the dry season, releasing cattle into the 
341 forest is not the only alternative (S8, S18). Therefore, this type of farmer may be genuinely more 
342 environmentally concerned than the other two, either intrinsically (subsequent to his experience) or 
343 because he has internalised the discourse externally introduced by conservation institutions.
344 The environmentally-conscious factor is characterised by having a relatively higher level of 
345 income from off-farm activities, possessing less land and deriving a lower share of benefits from 
346 external payment schemes (Table 1). He is motivated to conserve land but he does not feel as self-
347 sufficient and capable as the pioneer. He is also not as proactive in trying new livelihood activities 
348 (S22). Thus we interpret this factor also as a follower regarding the adoption of silvopasture.
349 4.2.3 The payment-dependent conservative
350 The third factor represents an individual that is conservative, payment-dependent, rent-
351 seeking, and late adopter or laggard with respect to innovations. He believes that his livelihood is 
352 highly dependent on external payments, emphasising most strongly the need for payments in order 
353 to live, both for his current livelihood and for his children's future (S15, S4). He emphasises that he 
354 may not be able to sustain his family without these payments and would also require PES to take 
355 care of the forest (S21).
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356 He believes that his descendants will work on the same land (S1), and that he will probably 
357 not produce enough animal feed if he sticks to current practices (S24). Yet, he does not perceive 
358 that his land is currently degrading (S12). He asserts that he can get more benefits from cattle 
359 without damaging the land, and that during the dry season he cannot do anything other than release 
360 his cattle into the forest (S6, S18). He also has the lowest preference toward fodder trees; his 
361 investment preference between pasture and fodder trees is ambiguous (S2), but he clearly prefers 
362 direct purchase of cattle than investment in fodder trees (S17). He considers that it is not convenient 
363 for him to weed the fodder tree plot (S20), although he acknowledges that planting fodder trees 
364 does not involve much effort (S7).
365 Because he is not keen on trying new practices (S22), this individual is likely to be a late 
366 adopter of innovative practices. Because he states high dependence on external payments (which are 
367 a form of immediate, easy income) he can be described as rent-seeking, therefore PES may 
368 encourage his participation in conservation programmes. However if the payment stops before the 
369 practice yields further benefits, he may possibly abandon it (Pagiola et al., 2007).
370 Smallholders with this perspective have a significant positive correlation with cattle 
371 specialisation and with more years of experience in cattle farming (Table 1). They are also 
372 associated with a lower share of benefits from off-farm activities.
373 5 Discussion: reconsidering the role of external rewards in the context of heterogeneous 
374 motivations
375 5.1 The diversity of motivations for adoption of silvopasture
376 The three main perspectives uncovered in the case study are largely consistent with the roles 
377 predicted in the theory of diffusion of innovations, according to their general attitude: pioneers, 
378 followers and late adopters (Läpple and van Rensburg, 2011; Rogers, 1962). The perspectives are 
379 also relatively consistent with other typologies found in the literature on adoption of sustainable 
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380 agricultural practices. Most studies that investigate typologies of potential adopters identify at least 
381 one perspective of environmentalists (Brodt et al., 2006; Valdivia et al., 2012), active adopters 
382 moved by environmental awareness (Morris and Potter, 1995), or ecosophists (Vartdal 1993 in 
383 Padel, 2001). These types are substantially similar to the environmentally-conscious follower 
384 identified here. The payment-dependent conservative may be related to previous types such as those 
385 characterised by their resistance to adopt (Barnes et al., 2011; Morris and Potter, 1995), production 
386 maximisers (Brodt et al., 2006), and passive adopters (Morris and Potter, 1995), who are not moved 
387 by conservation concerns.
388 The first perspective in this study (self-sufficient pioneer) is the most novel one in the social-
389 environmental literature, because this type of farmer is a likely adopter of sustainable innovation 
390 but is motivated by the potential livelihood benefits that the practice might bring, rather than strictly 
391 by environmental reasons. In previous literature, counterparts closest to this perspective are found 
392 in categories such as networking entrepreneurs (Brodt et al., 2006) and, roughly, pragmatic organic 
393 (Darnhofer et al., 2005).
394 In addition to the distinction of roles based on diffusion, the Q results provide a rich 
395 description of perspectives in terms of topics relevant to silvopasture adoption and to interventions, 
396 particularly the perceptions on incentives and towards conservation. The data suggest that none of 
397 the three perspectives has a clearly favourable predisposition to adopt silvopasture. Yet each 
398 perspective also has distinct reasons why they might potentially adopt silvopastoral systems. These 
399 reasons are the latent motivations that can be stimulated to increase adoption. Finding specific 
400 incentives to stimulate these motivations may be instrumental for policy design.
401 The self-sufficient pioneer may adopt only if the practice is believed to be novel and 
402 connected with potential broader livelihood improvements, despite the perceived risks. He sees no 
403 need for external economic incentives in order to experiment. In contrast, the motivation of the 
404 environmentally-conscious follower could be associated with normative or moral concerns driven 
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405 by a long-term notion of human-land interactions. The payment-dependent conservative may adopt 
406 in a first phase if there is a clear external monetary support involved, or otherwise at a later stage 
407 when realising that the early adopters corroborate the economic benefits of the practice. In the case 
408 study, it is important to note that the payment-dependent conservative is linked to cattle 
409 specialisation; thus those who have arguably a stronger impact over the land are also those less 
410 likely to change.
411 The main characteristics of the self-sufficient pioneers and payment-dependent conservatives 
412 are generally consistent with two types of potential adopters identified by Pagiola et al. (2007). 
413 These authors indicate that PES are not needed by farmers for whom silvopasture is profitable 
414 enough to justify adoption, while for those for whom silvopasture is not profitable at all, adoption 
415 happens only while the payment lasts.
416 In sum, the self-sufficient pioneers and the environmentally-conscious followers—who are 
417 more receptive to adopt silvopastoral practices—are less motivated by immediate external 
418 economic incentives. Likely, they may be highly responsive to other interventions such as sharing 
419 information, purporting the benefits of the practice transparently, or facilitating experimentation. 
420 These interventions can, for example, raise the self-sufficient pioneers' expectations of benefits, 
421 understood in a broad sense, or reduce the perceived risk involved in experimentation.
422 5.2 Incentives for social-ecological innovation and potential policy strategies
423 Designing PES in a manner that disregards the multiple motivations that drive participants' 
424 livelihood decisions may have an unexpected impact on policy performance. For example, the 
425 payment-dependent conservative may try the innovative activity attracted by the expectation of 
426 income gains in the short term. After the pilot stage, if the viability and the benefits of the 
427 sustainable practice are realised, payments may not be necessary for any of these types of 
428 individuals; continuation and diffusion of the practice would occur normally. In this case, initial 
429 payments would possibly not imply an increase in overall adoption rates but instead a more 
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430 uniform, accelerated adoption process, because more payment-dependent conservatives would 
431 participate at earlier stages of the scheme. Instead, if the budget of the external programme is 
432 exhausted before the activity is perceived as viable and beneficial, then it is expected that the 
433 payment-dependent conservative will discontinue because his main motivation to adopt the practice 
434 would disappear (Pagiola et al., 2007). In such a situation, the programme may fail to induce a 
435 sustained adoption of the sustainable innovation, probably eroding the permanence of the policy 
436 impacts.
437 Contrary to what much of the literature on PES suggests, voluntary participation in 
438 conservation programmes may occur regardless of the uncertain balance between investment and 
439 return or of net financial opportunity costs (Kosoy et al., 2007). Payments that cover the opportunity 
440 cost might be more correlated with adoption rates in contexts of commoditised market relationships; 
441 in these contexts, farmers' profit-maximising rationale translates into their effort being proportional 
442 to the economic incentive (Heyman and Ariely, 2004). However, in contexts of wider social 
443 exchange and longer term perceptions of human-land interactions, additional motivations may 
444 underlie the voluntary adoption of conservation activities, meaning that uptake may not be related 
445 to payment levels alone (Heyman and Ariely, 2004; Muradian et al., 2010). More general 
446 behavioural motivations include moral or internal motivations and values (Bowles, 2008; Lokhorst 
447 et al., 2011; Mzoughi, 2011), such as exploration, looking for innovations, curiosity for 
448 experimentation, personal fulfilment, or avoiding becoming an outcast. These are motivational 
449 drivers that might go a long way compared to immediate pecuniary returns.
450 Conservation programmes designed to fit an assumed short-term market-transaction mindset 
451 and self-interested behaviour can generate a misfit (Brown, 2003) between the design and the 
452 recipients' behavioural motivations at the implementation stage (Bowles, 2008). This can potentially 
453 result in the erosion of the longer term permanence of the sustainable activity (Muradian et al., 
454 2013). It is argued that this misalignment might be due to decisions and behaviour being context-
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455 dependent (Clot et al., 2015). However, environmental psychology also indicates that such 
456 behavioural motivations have certain patterns that are not context-dependent and are more complex 
457 than those envisaged by rational assumptions (e.g. Osbaldiston and Schott, 2012), as suggested by 
458 our empirical data.
459 A plausible policy strategy could be to target the distribution of incentives, not necessarily 
460 payments, to so-called pioneers, who are intrinsically more motivated towards experimentation and 
461 for whom a short-term payment is a secondary interest. The type of external incentive to catalyse 
462 the pioneers' motivations could be, for example, providing a transparent and convincing 
463 informational strategy (Calatrava and Franco, 2011; Egmond et al., 2006) that emphasises the 
464 innovative aspect of the new technique and its potential to benefit adopters in social, economic and 
465 ecological ways. In turn, this requires providing adequate, clear and comprehensive information 
466 about the advantages and disadvantages of the new practice. Reinforcing it through multiple 
467 authoritative and trusted sources may reduce the uncertainty involved (Garbach et al., 2012). 
468 Further, pioneers may arguably see their motivation spurred if their leading action is socially 
469 rewarded (Heyman and Ariely, 2004), for instance by acknowledging their service to the 
470 community, or by promoting them as educators or demonstrators in a process of constructive 
471 communication with other potential adopters (Atwell and Schulte, 2009; Egmond et al., 2006). 
472 Targeting pioneers specifically may be challenging not only due to the difficulty of 
473 identifying these individuals but also for equity and fairness perception concerns. A selective 
474 distribution of an incentive could be perceived as unfair by the rest and negatively affect the 
475 effectiveness of the program as a result (Pascual et al., 2014). Both hurdles may be overcome by 
476 designing the intervention with characteristics that implicitly attract mostly the so-called pioneers 
477 and with conditions that are not appealing to the payment-dependent, so that pioneers self-select 
478 themselves. This design could be realised by providing incentives that specifically tackle needs that 
479 are important for the early innovators but do not directly provide rent, such as information, capacity 
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480 building or approaches to reduce uncertainty. Later interventions could be based, for example, on 
481 catalysing trust between pioneers and followers by enhancing social networks or social influence 
482 (Abrahamse and Steg, 2013), or facilitating interaction to encourage the flow of knowledge from 
483 early adopters (Baumgart-Getz et al., 2012; Morris et al., 2000). Alternatively, unfairness 
484 perceptions might be reduced if the recipients of incentives are selected through applications to 
485 demonstrate suitability, as if it were a selection for a job position (Knight et al., 2010).10
486 Targeting may also be achieved by designing a dynamic and adaptive program. For example, 
487 in a first phase, no information would be provided about prospective payments or other similar 
488 incentives, but rather about proven potential benefits of the practice, so that mostly pioneers would 
489 volunteer to participate. In a second phase, small payments might be introduced to attract new 
490 participants among those who are potentially followers but are undecided. In a third phase, when 
491 the benefits of the activity begin to realise and both pioneers and followers have already adopted the 
492 new practice, further payments might be necessary to accelerate the participation of late adopters. 
493 This dynamic approach that adapts incentives in stages in order to match diffusion roles 
494 complements the recognised need for adaptability and flexibility of PES (Pascual et al., 2014).
495 6 Conclusions
496 In order to be flexible and adaptive, incentive-based policy instruments such as PES require a 
497 priori understanding of the key underlying behavioural motivations of individuals who participate 
498 in conservation initiatives. However, to date there is a paucity of empirical research that can serve 
499 as a model for cost-effective identification of the heterogeneity of such motivations.
500 In this paper we uncover the heterogeneity of motivations among participants in a PES-like 
501 project to encourage sustainable silvopastoral practices in a tropical forest frontier in Mexico. We 
10 The idea of calls for applications was put forward by Knight in a presentation of the fieldwork used for the study 
cited.
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502 have connected the theory of incentive-based conservation programmes to promote the diffusion of 
503 pro-environmental behaviour, with a case of a scheme to encourage silvopastoral adoption in a 
504 small community in Chiapas. We provide empirical evidence about the importance of 
505 understanding the attitudinal fabric of a small and otherwise seemingly homogeneous community. 
506 Our study provides further evidence to support that applying Q methodology facilitates the 
507 exploration of diverse viewpoints and motivations for the adoption of sustainable practices in a 
508 wide range of socio-cultural contexts (e.g. Nordhagen et al., 2017). Ascertaining such motivations 
509 can help identify pioneers in a diffusion process, who can play a key role as catalysts for the 
510 adoption of innovative practices.
511 Our findings contribute to acknowledging the importance of careful design of PES schemes 
512 where people’s motivations are likely to be heterogeneous. We find evidence to support that PES 
513 design needs to discourage rent-seeking strategies driven by short-term financial benefits 
514 (Kronenberg and Hubacek, 2013). We argue that uncovering the latent diversity of motivations for 
515 adoption of sustainable practices is key for the cost-effective design of PES schemes and to avoid 
516 rent-seeking strategies that could undermine their effectiveness in the medium to long term. 
517 Analysing the motivations of non-participants and of individuals in other locations with potential 
518 for implementing silvopastoral systems may inform further how to best encourage adoption of such 
519 practices.
520 Based on our findings from Chiapas in the context of the silvopastoral adoption program, we 
521 derive two general implications for the design of voluntary payment schemes such as PES. First, a 
522 higher cost-effectiveness and a more permanent behavioural change toward adoption of the 
523 environmental innovation can be achieved by designing conservation programmes in a way that 
524 they deactivate or minimise rent-seeking strategies, which are the ones most likely to discontinue 
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525 the activity once the budget supporting the programme ceases.11 Second, a stronger emphasis on 
526 engaging so-called self-sufficient pioneers from the outset may also enhance cost-effectiveness. 
527 Accordingly, PES-like schemes may be designed in a way that they implicitly attract 
528 individuals genuinely interested in the conservation activity first (which may also include so-called 
529 environmentally-conscious followers). These individuals are more likely to strive for successful 
530 environmental performance and may have a boosting effect in getting the rest to adopt, when the 
531 demonstration of the private benefits from the activity is sufficient to motivate others. The self-
532 sufficient pioneers may be encouraged by catalysing their latent motivations to adopt the pro-
533 environmental practice. It has to be taken into account though, that for this type of individual 
534 financial stimuli may not be the most appropriate incentive and can be insufficient (Läpple and 
535 Kelley, 2013) or even counterproductive to foster adoption and continuation in the longer term, due 
536 to the potential to crowd-out intrinsic motivations (Bowles, 2008; Midler et al., 2015).
537 Complexity in social-ecological systems is due to many factors, not least to the heterogeneity 
538 of preferences and motivations of key actors that manage land. Assuming that the behavioural 
539 drivers of these actors are homogeneous (due to their similar socio-cultural and economic 
540 background) blinds us from the richness of their motivations. Any policy intervention in such 
541 contexts must account for the diversity of behavioural motivations, otherwise it is likely that its 
542 effects may be minimal if not counterproductive to the original goals.
11 The continuation of pro-environmental behaviour after a payment-based intervention has been questioned in the 
literature, and some evidence has been provided (Reutemann et al., 2016). However, further empirical research is 
needed to understand the long-term impact.
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813 Appendices
Table A1: Original statements in Spanish. Key for topics: (A) importance of external payments in 
livelihoods; (B) environmental and conservation values; (C) personal attitudes towards work and 
livelihoods; (D) beliefs and preferences about cattle farming and land use; and (E) preferences and 
trade-offs between planting fodder trees and other livelihood activities, including perceptions about 
potential benefits of fodder trees.
ID Topic Statement Original statement in Spanish
1 C My children and grandchildren will work the same 
land that I cultivate now
En las tierras que trabajo, trabajarán también mis 
hijos y nietos 
2 E I prefer two hectares of pasture than one hectare of 
fodder trees
Prefiero 2 hectáreas de pasto de corte que 1 
hectárea de mataratón o guash 
3 A The knowledge to earn more is what is of most 
interest to me from external programmes.
Lo que más me interesa de los programas es lo que 
aprendo para ganar más dinero 
4 A I can maintain my family with my own work, 
external payments are just an aid
Puedo mantener a mi familia con mi propio trabajo. 
Los subsidios sólo ayudan 
5 E With tree planting programmes I receive more 
money in return for my work
Con los programas de plantar árboles recibo más 
dinero por mi trabajo 
6 D I could increase my benefits in cattle farming 
without degrading the land
Podría obtener más ganancias de criar ganado sin 
por ello estropear la tierra 
7 E Cultivating fodder trees involves a lot of effort and 
little benefit
Sembrar bastante mataratón o guash significa 
mucho esfuerzo y poco beneficio 
8 A I participate in all external programmes that bring 
income
Participo en todos los programas que traen recurso 
9 C It is more convenient for me to cultivate my own 
food than buying it
Me conviene más producir mi propia comida que 
comprarla 
10 B Conserving the forest is responsibility of the 
landowner
Conservar el bosque es responsabilidad del dueño 
del terreno 
11 C I analyse my costs and benefits and thereafter I work 
on the most beneficial activity
Hago las cuentas de lo que mejor me sale y me 
dedico a ello 
12 D My land is 'getting tired' Mis terrenos se están cansando 
13 D Benefits from cattle production are larger than loses 
from its related land degradation.
Lo que da el ganado es mucho más de lo que pierde 
la tierra 
14 E It takes too long for fodder trees to grow El mataratón y el guash para forraje tardan 
demasiado en crecer 
15 A We need more external payments so that my children 
do not need to go to live elsewhere
Es necesario que me den más subsidios para que mis 
hijos no tengan que ir a vivir a otro sitio 
16 D It is more convenient for me to invest money in 
improving my pastures than in buying cows
Me conviene más invertir dinero en tener mejores 
pasturas que en tener más vacas 
17 E If I had more money, I would plant fodder trees 
instead of increasing my cattle
Si tuviera más terreno, le sembraría mataratón o 
guash en lugar de aumentar mis vacas 
18 D In dry season there is no alternative other than 
releasing my cows free into the mountain
En secas no hay otro remedio que soltar las vacas al 
monte 
19 D With more training I could improve very much my 
work in cattle farming
Con más capacitación, podría mejorar mucho mi 
trabajo con el ganado 
20 E It is convenient to weed my fodder tree plot even if I 
have other tasks, to produce more fodder.
Me conviene deshierbar mi parcela de mataratón o 
guash aunque tenga mucho trabajo, para tener más 
forraje
21 A If the government does not give me external 
payments, taking care of the forest does not benefit 
me
Si el gobierno no me da subsidios, no me beneficia 
cuidar el bosque 
22 C I try new things in my job Pruebo cosas nuevas en mi trabajo 
23 A I would rather live by external payments than by 
working my land.
Prefiero vivir de los subsidios que del trabajo en mis 
tierras 
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24 D I need to improve my pasture, otherwise cattle feed 
will run out in a few years
Necesito mejorar mis potreros porque si no se 
acabará el alimento para mis vacas en unos años 
25 B I can earn more as a cattle farmer if I let other wild 
animals live
Puedo ganar más como ganadero si dejo vivir a los 
otros animales del bosque 
26 E In order to dedicate one hectare to fodder trees 
during two years, I would need more land
Para excluir una hectárea de mataratón o guash por 
dos años, necesitaría más terreno del que tengo 
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Table A2: Factor loadings and flagged Q-sorts (indicated with stars)
Respondent 1. Self-sufficient 2. Environmentalist 3. Payment-dependent
1 -.16 -.12 .45 *
2 -.11 .32 .39 *
3 .10 .08 .58 *
4 .23 .54 * .36
5 .64 * .20 .18
6 .12 .02 .70 *
7 .50 * -.04 .35
8 .66 * .19 .35
9 .22 .52 * .35
10 .41 .30 .36
11 .70 * .28 .34
12 .29 .29 .42 *
13 .32 .14 .63 *
14 .69 * .08 -.02
15 .60 * .20 -.02
16 .54 * .25 .11
17 .08 .24 .47 *
18 .29 .60 * -.03
19 .52 .47 .24
20 .15 .62 * .13
21 .43 .50 * .25
22 .30 .57 * .07
23 .59 * .22 .06
24 .35 .37 .37
25 .49 * .25 -.06
26 .61 * .44 .00
27 .43 .45 .21
28 .73 * .23 .08
29 .38 .67 * .04
30 .39 * .14 .05
31 .00 .60 * .01
32 .42 * .34 .20
